History of the Army Aviation Warrant Officer
The establishment of the Air Force as a separate armed service and the demobilization of the armed forces after World War II created serious shortages of aviators in Army Ground Forces. Organic Army Aviation was cut to its pre-World War II level just when the Army was trying to increase organic aviation. With the arrival of new helicopters, the Army needed more helicopter pilots but congressionally imposed commissioned officer strength levels prevented pilot expansion. The Army requested authority to establish the Flight Officer/Warrant Officer program. This proposal was rejected because the Army already had three groups of personnel - -enlisted, warrant officer and commissioned officer. As a fall back position, the Department of the Army decided that the grade of flight officer was in reality a Warrant Officer grade with a restriction to the Warrant Officer Junior Grade rank (WOJG).
This proposal envisioned a Warrant Officer pilot who would spend an entire military career in the aviation field, much like the concept of today’s Aviation Warrant Officer. Because there was no Aviation Branch for commissioned officers or enlisted soldiers, the Warrant Officer pilot would provide the continuity needed in Army Aviation. The Army felt that the Warrant Officer pilot would ensure stability and expertise that was often diminished or lost completely due to commissioned officer rotation in and out of aviation assignments. Commissioned officers were required to maintain their branch expertise to be promoted. With Warrant Officer pilots staying in aviation flying assignments throughout their careers, aviation would gain the stability needed to maintain combat effectiveness.
The officers involved with Army Aviation had great plans for the use of the Warrant Officer pilot. The Department of the Army policy for the proposed Warrant Officer pilot limited them to the operation of aircraft on administrative type missions only. So despite the tremendous World War II record of flight officer/warrant officer aviators, when a mission involved transporting field grade staff officers or required technical or tactical responsibilities the aircraft was piloted by a commissioned officer.
Army leaders were certain that Army Aviation would benefit in many ways from the Warrant Officer pilot program, in spite of restrictive policies. First, the Warrant Officer pilot could become the capstone of the enlisted maintenance career; second, commissioned officer pilot shortages could be filled by Warrant Officer pilots; third, Warrant Officer pilots could carry a large portion of the commissioned officer aviator additional duties, thus allowing commissioned officers more freedom and greater involvement in command duties; and fourth it would cost less to pay Warrant Officer pilots than commissioned officer pilots. With the number of Pilot positions required, the Army envisioned all aviator positions from second lieutenant through captain being converted to Warrant Officer pilot positions.
In late 1949, the Warrant Officer pilot proposal was approved. Army leaders decided that the WO helicopter pilot MOS should be made available to qualified enlisted soldiers and to qualified civilian personnel. Although the Artillery School at Fort Sill trained officers and enlisted personnel in advanced aviation skills, the Transportation Corps was designated as the proponent agency for aviation WO MOS, with the Air Force still responsible for Army aviator flight training.
Meanwhile, the Adjutant General decided that inclusion of the helicopter pilot in the aircraft maintenance career field was inappropriate. The Army Staff agreed there was no apparent relationship between aircraft maintenance and the knowledge and skills necessary to fly helicopters. It was decided that technical knowledge in mechanics was not a prerequisite for helicopter pilot training since no other service used aircraft mechanic technical knowledge as a prerequisite for pilot training. The Warrant Officer Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) code was designated “1066.” Regardless of what aircraft a Warrant Officer pilot was qualified in, there was only one MOS. The news spread quickly and the Army began receiving applications from across the spectrum of enlisted career fields.
The first Warrant Officer Candidate class to train in helicopters was the Army Helicopter Pilot Course, Class 51A. The class started training in April 1951 with 28 students and graduated 25 students in December 1951. (See Army Letter Feb. 1951)
When students initially began training, they were told that after 12 months in grade as a Warrant Officer they would receive commissions similar to flight officers in the Army Air Forces. But after 39 months in grade, none of the Warrant Officers received nor was offered a commission. In fact, they were all still WO1; none had been promoted to CW2. It wasn’t until 1955 that WO1 started being promoted. Flight pay remained another inequity, and it wasn’t until 23 years later, in 1974, that Warrant Officer pilots received flight pay equal to commissioned officer pilots.
The transportation helicopter table of organization and equipment (TOE), TD 55-57T, was published in 1950 with positions that called for WO helicopter pilots. Each company had 21 H-19 Sikorsky, 12-place helicopters (nicknamed “Chickasaw”). Five of these helicopter transportation companies were slated for duty in Korea. Of the five, only two reached Korea before the end of the war, the 6th and 13th. They both departed for Korea on 7 December 1952 and were the first Army helicopter companies in combat.
These first Warrant Officer helicopter pilots played an important role in the early development of Army Aviation. Newly rated Warrant Officer pilots evacuated wounded soldiers, directed artillery strikes, and transported troops and supplies throughout the Korean battlefield.
Aviation Warrant Officers, although few in number, proved their worth to the Army. It appeared that the helicopter and the Warrant Officer pilot were here to stay. No one then could envision the role WO helicopter pilots would ultimately play in the evolution of Army Aviation.
After the Korean War, the Army Aviation School moved from Fort Sill, OK to Camp Rucker, AL in the latter part of 1954. With the increased emphasis on helicopter training, the rotary wing training section was elevated to a department level status equal in status to fixed wing training. The first helicopter class at Fort Rucker began training with 6 commissioned officers, 2 warrant officers, and 17 warrant officer candidates (WOC) and graduated on 30 April 1955.
In the mid-1950s, Army Aviation began to reorganize and expand. Camp Rucker was redesignated Fort Rucker effective 13 October 1955. The Department of Defense (DOD) directed the Army to assume all Army Aviation training and in April 1956 transferred Wolters Air Force Base Texas, to the Army. The Army redesignated the base to Camp Wolters. In July 1956, Camp Wolters Texas became the U.S. Army Primary Helicopter Center and School. Camp Wolters later became Fort Wolters and Aviation Warrant Officer Candidates were trained at this post from November 1956 until 1973. For more about the school and post visit the History page of the Fort Wolters Chapter, Viet Nam Helicopter Pilots Association (VHPA).
Fort Rucker, AL then became the Army advanced helicopter school. From 1953 to 1957, an in-depth analysis was completed to determine whether the Aviation Warrant Officer Corps should be continued and what, if any, its future role should be. These studies determined that Warrant Officers should remain an integral part of Army Aviation. However, much like today, due to budget cuts and WO strength caps, WO appointments were reduced. Warrant officer Pilot training was suspended in 1959 after only 1,100 Warrant Officer pilots had been trained.
In 1961, Army Aviation deployed its first helicopter and fixed wing units to Vietnam. In 1963, Warrant Officer pilot training was resumed with an input of 720 Warrant Officer Candidates.
The mid-1960s saw a dramatic period of growth for Aviation Warrant Officers. Aviation WO strength swelled from approximately 2,960 in 1966 to more than 12,000 by 1970. No one envisioned the impact that WO aviators would have on the conduct of the war in Vietnam, nor the impact Vietnam would have on Army Aviation.
In 1962, the Army began an in-depth study and test of the tactical air mobility of organic Army ground forces. These tests proved the air mobility concept and the necessity and value of Warrant Officer pilots. As a result of these tests, the 11th Air Assault was formed. On 1 July 1965, it became the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) and deployed to Vietnam in August. As more combat units deployed to Vietnam, aviation became more visible and its role in combat were apparent. Warrant officer aviators flew through the heaviest concentrations of enemy fire in the Vietnam War and were involved in every aspect of combat operations. Helicopters became the symbol of the Vietnam War, and helicopter pilots were among the first to be killed in the war and among the last to leave. The combat attrition rate for Aviation Warrant Officer Pilots was 20 times that of United States Air Force (USAF), United States Navy (USN), and United States Marine Corps (USMC) aviators. This was in large part due to the intense loyalty these aviators shared and the leadership role played by many Aviation Warrant Officers. An Aviation Warrant Officer would land to rescue a downed aircrew regardless of the circumstances, weather conditions, or enemy firepower. This had a profound positive effect on Army aviator morale.
Aviation Warrant Officers did more than just fly in Vietnam; they performed as aviation section leaders, platoon leaders, operations officers, and liaison officers. A few Warrant Officers even commanded companies for brief periods. Despite their tremendous success as combat leaders in Vietnam, Aviation Warrant Officers were often on the receiving end of some strange local policies. In Korea in 1969, some commanders specifically forbade any Aviation Warrant Officer from being an aircraft commander in their unit. Uniform policies were mixed as well. Aviation Warrant Officers were forbidden to wear flight jackets and had to wear field jackets to keep warm while flying. Aviation Warrant Officer instructor pilots at Fort Wolters, Texas, were issued Nomex flight suits only after all other instructors and officer students had received theirs. Supplies of flight suits from this new material were limited; so, priorities for issue were based on rank not on mission. Forming the Aviation Branch in the early eighties helped eliminate many of these inequities.
The early 1970s saw a reduction in force (RIF) and reduced Aviation Warrant Officer accessions. The field Army officially left Vietnam in March 1973. As a direct result of the heat seeking missile threat faced in Vietnam in 1972 and 1973, the tactics of Army Aviation. Nap-of-the-earth flying became the tactic of the period and by the late seventies night vision goggles were also being used. A key event also occurred during this period. In 1974 as a result of a Congressional Committee recommendation Aviation Warrant Officers received flight pay equalization with commissioned aviators.
In 1973 Aviation training for women was authorized based on an Army Chief of Staff decision. The first female warrant officer candidate entered this training program in fiscal year 1974 and the first completed the training and was appointed as a warrant officer in fiscal year 1975.
Modernized aircraft began flowing into the inventory beginning with the UH-60 Blackhawk. A fateful personnel decision was made in conjunction with fielding the Blackhawk. Army policy sent new, inexperienced aviators through Blackhawk transition. When this policy was coupled with an aircraft transition of only 15 hours and a few manufacturer design flaws, the overall accident rate for Army Aviation skyrocketed. This led to a series of messages by General Thurman who was then the Army Vice Chief of Staff. These messages required the Aviation Branch to institutionalize a process that directly involved the chain of command in the mission briefing and crew selection process.
In the early 1980s, the AH-64 Apache and the modernized CH-47D Chinook began to arrive. The Apache initially required significant factory support. Intensive management overcame these problems and the aircraft distinguished itself in two subsequent wars.
From 1981 through 1987, Aviation Warrant Officer accessions were curtailed to allow more non-rated Warrant Officers to be accessed. This was necessary because active duty WO budget end strength (BES) was, and is, constrained below the level necessary to fill documented, modified tables of equipment (MTOE) and tables of distribution and allowances (TDA), positions.
On 12 April 1983, Aviation became a branch. Commissioned officers and enlisted soldiers were designated to wear the branch insignia. A request was submitted to the Army leadership to authorize Aviation Warrant Officers to bear the Aviation branch insignia as an exception to the regulation which requires all warrant officers to wear the warrant officer insignia in lieu of the branch insignia. The request was denied. Aviation Warrant Officers have been centrally managed since 1965, first in the Warrant Officer Aviation Branch and since 1975 by the Warrant Officer Division, Total Army Personnel Command, which manages all warrant officers less the Special branches. This centralized management insures the integrity of the Warrant officer Corps by assigning, managing and professionally developing warrant officers, regardless of specialty.
Since 1954, Aviation Warrant Officers provided the tactical and technical continuity for ground forces aviation for nearly 30 years. The wearing of branch insignia versus the warrant officer insignia remained a controversial issue among many Aviation Warrant Officers.
In 1984, the Chief of Staff, Army charted the Total Warrant Officer Study (TWOS) to redefine current and future roles, and training requirements, for Warrant Officers to meet the Army and individual needs. The CSA approved the TWOS results in June 1985. The TWOS took a close look at how, when, where, and why the Army trains Warrant Officers. As a result of the findings, many changes occurred in the way the Army accesses, trains, and manages Warrant Officers. (Continued next page) The TWOS career program included the establishment of the branch immaterial Warrant Officer Candidate Course (WOCC), the development of the common core Senior Warrant Officer Training Course (SWOTC), and the implementation of the Master Warrant Officer Training Course (MWOTC). All of these Warrant Officer Training System (WOTS) courses were established at the United States Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) by the fall of 1988.
TWOS also recommended that legislation (Warrant Officer Management Act) be submitted to Congress to create the rank of CW5, a single promotion system, provisions for a selective early retirement process, and management by years of Warrant Officer service.
The Master Warrant Officer (MWO) program was instituted to select, train, and identify CW4s who would occupy Master Warrant (MW) positions until the Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) legislation was passed by Congress.
A new Warrant Officer definition under TWOS finally recognized the leadership roles and responsibilities that Aviation Warrant Officers had been filling since 1942.
TWOS also required that all Warrant Officer positions be stratified into three levels of responsibilities. These levels were “WO” for WO1 and CW2, “SW” for CW3 and CW4, and “MW" for MW4 and CW5. Even with Aviation Warrant Officer positions stratified into three levels, WO1 through CW4s were still interchangeable for utilization purposes. Army Regulation 614-100 allows Aviation Warrant Officers to be utilized in the next lower rank group. This meant that a SW with the rank of CW4 could be used in the next lower rank group of WO.
In 1986, all Aviation Branch Aviation Warrant Officer positions were coded as WO, SW, or MW. This initial coding effort was flawed from the outset by artificial constraints. The Aviation Branch was not allowed to establish MW positions where they were needed but was forced to code only existing, one-deep positions as MW. This resulted in the majority of MW positions being coded for aviation safety officers with the remaining MW positions being spread from company to corps level. Another artificial constraint was the number of MW positions allocated to the Aviation Branch. With a MW position cap of 3.4 percent, the branch was limited to 235 MW positions. To support the war fighting requirements of the branch, 347 MW positions were needed. To fix this dysfunctional rank coding problem would take the next 6 years.
During the mid-1980s, aviation units were transitioning to the Army of Excellence (AOE). This revised structure proved to have lasting adverse impact on the maintainability and sustainability of the branch. Maintainer positions were reduced by approximately 33 percent while aircraft were reduced by only 9 percent. What had previously been called a platoon was now called a company, still commanded by a captain. What previously had been called a company and commanded by a major was now called a battalion and commanded by a lieutenant colonel.
In 1986, the Enlisted Aviator Study (EAS) was completed. The results of this study concluded that creating an enlisted aviator was possible but not desirable. The leadership role of Aviation Warrant Officers encompassed nearly all flight training, maintenance test flights, safety, and operations. To eliminate the Aviation Warrant Officer would have been a large step backward in maintaining the war fighting capability of the Aviation Branch.
In the spring of 1987, the Aviation Branch Personnel Proponency began to actively participate in controlling new accessions and all flight-training seats for the branch. This resulted in increased Aviation Warrant Officer accessions in fiscal years 1988, 1989, and 1990 and reduced aviation commissioned officer accessions.
A policy change was implemented by Major General Parker, then Aviation Branch Chief, that called for “training to requirements.” This new policy had several ramifications. Since there were no instructor pilot positions for Aviation Commissioned Officers except at the U.S. Army Aviation Center, all HQDA instructor pilot training seats for Aviation Commissioned Officers were eliminated. The fixed wing selection board process for Aviation Warrant Officers was validated as a viable process but flawed in execution. Senior Aviation Warrant Officers, highly qualified in advanced helicopters, were being selected for fixed wing training. Not only did an under strength Military Occupational Specialty lose a highly competent operator, trainer, or maintainer, but the aviator found himself senior in rank yet junior in experience in the fixed wing community. By the early 1990s, the fixed wing aviator population had reached an inverse career field make-up of 53 percent in the rank of CW4, 37 percent in the rank of CW3, and 10 percent in the rank of CW2.
By 1988, authorizations for Aviation Warrant Officers were rapidly outdistancing the branch’s ability to train. The HQDA staff determined that too many Aviation Warrant Officer positions had been documented. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations removed 142 Aviation Warrant Officer positions labeled as “over structure.”
Operation “Prime Chance saw Army Aviation in the unparalleled role of protecting the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf. Flying armed and updated versions of the venerable OH-58 scout of Vietnam fame, Aviation Warrant Officers sought out and attacked enemy vessels engaged in mining international waterways.
In 1989, the Army began reducing authorizations through a process called Quicksilver. Quicksilver I and II removed 1,209 Aviation Warrant Officer positions from the Active Component.
In December 1989, the world learned that Army Aviation owned the night. Operation “Just Cause” saw Army Aviation take its place as a full member of the combat arms community. In a brief but complex aviation based operation, United States forces, led by Army Aviation, successfully liberated Panama from the dictatorship of Manuel Noriega.
In August of 1990, President Bush ordered United States Forces into Saudi-Arabia to establish a defensive posture against Iraq. Operation “Desert Shield” was in response to the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. The military buildup continued throughout the fall and winter of 1990. One of the Aviation Warrant Officer personnel problems highlighted by this mobilization was the shortage of Aviation Warrant Officers in the aggregate, and Chinook and Blackhawk qualified Aviation Warrant Officers in specific.
The shortage of Aviation Warrant Officers in the aggregate was a direct result of Warrant Officer Budget End Strength constrained to a level below documented MTOE and TDA requirements. The shortage of Chinook and Blackhawk pilots was the direct result of the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) training budget decrements imposed in FYs 88, 89, and 90, exacerbated by worldwide fleet groundings for both aircraft types.
The Army civilian and military leadership learned that there is no short-term readiness risk when under funding Aviation Warrant Officer accessions, it is all long-term risk. Concentrated efforts by Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the U.S. Army Aviation Center (USAAVNC) were unable to make any progress on producing more Chinook and Blackhawk pilots until three months after the war ended in March of 1991.
In January 1991 the air war against Iraq began. The following month a 4-day ground war ensued. This ground war phase began when Army Aviation attack aircraft destroyed a radar site deep inside the borders of Iraq at 0200 in the morning. The majority of those attack cockpits were filled by Aviation Warrant Officers.
If there had ever been any doubt before, Desert Shield and Desert Storm had showcased the three primary tenets of the Aviation Branch—deployability, versatility, and lethality. This brief war again confirmed the combat leader role of Aviation Warrant Officers. These soldier-officer-aviators were at the forefront of both operations and led many combat sorties into enemy held territory.
Special Operations Aviation Warrant Officers assumed a key role in a mission that is the doctrinal province of the USAF. Search and rescue of downed Aviation aircrews is an Air Force mission, but the Special Operations, Aviation Warrant Officers were better trained and equipped. Many aircrews owe their lives to the bravery of these aviators who successfully completed dangerous rescue missions. Aviation non-rated maintenance officers excelled in directing the repair and maintenance of aircraft under exceptionally harsh environmental conditions.
While Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were in progress, HQDA planners were proceeding with plans to down size the Army. With the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the subsequent breakup of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic, the armed forces of the United States were charged with reducing the military structure and associated expenses.
One target of this reduction effort was Aviation Warrant Officers. With documented Aviation Warrant Officer requirements of about 7,200 and an actual inventory of 6,900, HQDA initially planned to selectively retire approximately 300 Aviation Warrant Officers in Fiscal Year 1992.
Despite the lessons learned in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm about the long-term adverse combat readiness impact of under funding the Aviation Warrant Officer Budget End Strength (BES), the Aviation Warrant Officer BES for Fiscal Years 1991 and 1992 was reduced below documented MTOE and TDA requirements levels.
In the fall of 1991, the President of the United States signed the Warrant Officer Management Act (WOMA) into law with an effective date of 1 February 1992. A Defense Department report on the WOMA stated technical expertise is still important, but no longer enough. Warrant officers, regardless of rank or specialty, also have to be proficient in basic tactical and leadership skills. In a fast moving combat environment, Warrant Officers could find themselves the senior leader in an isolated island of conflict. Their knowledge of tactics and ability to understand the commander’s strategy could spell the difference between survival or destruction. Their use of independent judgment and their ability to act quickly could decide the outcome of the battle. This doctrinal change now places heavy demands on Warrant Officers’ technical, tactical, and leadership abilities. They must be prepared to handle contingencies, to include assuming command, if isolated from commissioned officer leadership.
WOMA enacted key provisions of the TWOS by establishing the rank of CW5, a single promotion system, provisions for selectively retiring regular Army (RA) Warrant Officers, and managing warrant officers by year group, based on Years of warrant officer service (WOS). Unfortunately, there was no WOMA implementation team formed to convert this law into Army regulation.
Some senior HQDA officers wanted to schedule a Warrant Officer selective early retirement board (SERB) because the enlisted and commissioned officers (both groups were over strength) were going through the SERB process. This was despite the fact that the Aviation Warrant Officer inventory would be under the BES limit by the end of Fiscal Year 1992. Although there was no Warrant Officer Selective Early Retirement Board nor Reduction In Force (RIF) in Fiscal Year 1992, a Warrant Officer Selective Early Retirement Board was tentatively scheduled for October of 1992.
In February 1992, the Chief of Staff , army, General Gordon Sullivan, signed the Warrant Officer Leader Development Action Plan (WOLDAP). WOLDAP required that all Aviation Warrant Officer positions be stratified into four levels—WO, W3, W4, And W5; that appointment to WO1 occur upon graduation for the Warrant Officer Candidate Course; changed civilian education goals; that Warrant Officer common core training be established as a U.S. Army Aviation Center tenant element under the direct control of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, required pinpoint assignment of CW5s; and disapproved the Aviation Branch request for Aviation Warrant Officers to wear their branch insignia.
WOLDAP proved to be the solution for the continuing problem of Aviation Warrant Officer misutilization. Warrant officers were no longer interchangeable by Military Occupational Specialty and grade; just as with commissioned officers, rank and date of rank had precedence in occupying duty positions. For many, this was a new way of doing business.
Full implementation required that three major problems had to be overcome. First, the rank coding table had to be stratified into four vertical levels of Aviation Warrant Officer utilization; second, commanders at all levels had to understand that business as usual with regards to Aviation Warrant Officer utilization had changed, rank became a primary factor in Aviation Warrant Officer utilization; and third, Aviation Warrant Officers had to learn the new system. For example, if a newly assigned CW4 safety officer arrives at the assigned battalion and the current battalion safety officer is a CW3, the CW4 should occupy the battalion safety position and the CW3 should go to one of the line companies.
TWOS, WOMA, and WOLDAP combined to change the accession, training, utilization, promotion, and assignment of Aviation Warrant Officers. Warrant Officer Division, PERSCOM, began to assign Aviation Warrant Officers based on rank and Military Occupational Specialties. Installation assignments officers and S-l's must assign Aviation Warrant Officers to positions based on rank and aircraft skills.
Warrant officer aviators have come a long way. Over the years, warrant officers have more than proven themselves to be the backbone of Army Aviation. Without Warrant Officers, aviation branch maintenance, operations, training, and safety would cease.
(Note: The above was extracted from the fourth edition of the Army Aviation Personnel Plan.)
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Adjutant Genera
Washington, 25, D.C.
21 February 1951
SUBJECT: Army Helicopter Aviators (Warrant Officers)
TO: Commanding Generals, Continental Armies, Military District of Washington
1. Transportation Helicopter Companies are being organized at Fort Sill, Oklahoma in accordance with T/O&E 55-57, 24 October 1950. Transportation Helicopter Companies provide short haul transport to expedite tactical operations and logistical support in the forward areas of combat zones.
2. In order to provide personnel to operate the helicopters of these companies, a course of instruction is to be established to train selected individuals as Army helicopter aviators. Announcement of the course will be made by the Chief of Army Field Forces.
3.a. Warrant officers and enlisted men in any grade who volunteer for training as Army helicopter aviators and who meet the requirements prescribed below are eligible for selection.
1) Individual must volunteer for helicopter flight training.
2) Individual (if in an enlisted status) must have completed basic training.
3) Individual (if in an enlisted status) must have an aptitude Area II and VIII score of at least 110 (SR 615-25-25).
4) Individual must not have reached his thirtieth birthday, and be not less than 20 years and 6 months of age at the time of application for training.
5) Individual must not weigh over 180 pounds.
6) Individual must not be over 72 inches tall.
7) Individual must meet general physical standards prescribed in SR 140-110-1 for Class 1 or 1B.
b. The following statements, certitudes, forms, etc., as applicable, will be forwarded as inclosures to the application:
1) If licensed a private pilot or higher, two photostat copies of Airmen's Certificate and/or record of total flying time in duplicate, with correctness certified by the applicant.
2) If previously rated as a pilot in the military service, personnel orders in duplicate.
3) Standard Form 88 (Report of the Medical Examination), completed in triplicate.
4) A statement, in duplicate, by the commanding officer of enlisted applicant, certifying that scores of at least 110 were made in Aptitude Areas II and VIII (Reference paragraph 3a(3), above).
5) A statement, in duplicate, by the commanding officer of enlisted applicant evidencing good moral character (Reference paragraph 3a (9) above).
6) Standard Form 89 (Report of Medical History). (Reference paragraph 7, below).
7) Department of Defense Forms 98 and 98A (Loyalty Certificates) in triplicate. (Reference paragraph 7, below).
8) Statement of citizenship (Reference paragraph 3a(8), above).
c. Applications will be given expeditious handling at all echelons. All applications will be screened by each intermediate headquarters to insure that they have been properly prepared and that the applicants meet the provisions of AR 610-15, and SR 40-110-1, insofar as they are applicable to this directive.
1) Applicants who are selected to undergo flight training will be transferred to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for such training. They will be entitled to incentive pay for hazardous duty during the course of flight instruction.
2) Enlisted men who successfully complete the prescribed course and are selected as Army helicopter aviators will be appointed temporary warrant officers, if otherwise qualified (see AR 610-15). All individuals who successfully complete the course and are selected as Army helicopter aviators will be awarded an aeronautical designation and placed on flying status as an Army helicopter aviator.
3) Enlisted personnel who do not successfully complete the course of instruction will be reported for reassignment through normal channels, unless otherwise qualified for assignment to a Transportation Helicopter Company. Warrant officers who fail to qualify as Army Helicopter Aviators will be reported to the Adjutant General for reassignment.
4) The provisions of this letter will be disseminated to all installations within your command, but the most practicable expeditious means. It is desired that as many applications as possible reach the Chief of Transportation prior to 15 March 1951
BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY: